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Abstract 
In recent years, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has been increasingly called upon to 
settle disputes pertaining to migration in the Mediterranean. This article examines the developments in 
the ECtHR’s pertinent case law through the lens of vulnerability, a concept that offers much potential 
for developing the Convention on Human Rights in response to new challenges, such as those posed by 
the so-called ‘migration crisis’. By drawing upon literature from law, legal theory and (bio)ethics, this 
article will show that while the ECtHR is amenable to the recognition of vulnerability in its inherent, 
situational and pathogenic forms, the Court’s actual application of the concept both belies this sophis-
tication and squanders its potential. Indeed, despite widespread condemnation of the traditional, cate-
gorical conceptualisation of vulnerability, the ECtHR continues to rely on this simplistic and arguably 
invidious approach. As such, while the ECtHR may have extended vulnerability’s reach within its case 
law, it has nevertheless failed to recognise and effectively respond to the lived vulnerability of all who 
undertake hazardous journeys across the Mediterranean Sea, irrespective of the reason or reasons for 
their migration.
Keywords: vulnerability, migration, Mediterranean, European Court of Human Rights, ECtHR, asy-
lum, Khlaifia v Italy
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1. Introduction
Vulnerability is a ubiquitous yet highly contested concept. It has been characterised in literature 
as both universal and categorical, as enduring yet situational, as variable, occurrent, dispositional, 
pathogenic, layered, and more. In recent years, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR or 
Court) has drawn upon the complex concept of vulnerability with greater frequency.1 Simultaneous 
to this, the ECtHR has been called upon to adjudicate an increasing number of disputes within the 
Mediterranean migration context. It was with the Grand Chamber’s landmark judgment in M.S.S. 
v Belgium and Greece2 that the two collided. In M.S.S., the Court for the first time accepted that 
* Corresponding author details: Ben Hudson is a Lecturer in Law at the University of Lincoln. Ben’s research interests lie 
broadly in the area of human rights and forced migration, including both cross-border movements and internal displacement. 
The author would like to thank the Editorial Board and anonymous reviewers for their invaluable feedback as well as col-
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1 Alexandra Timmer, ‘A Quiet Revolution: Vulnerability in the European Court of Human Rights’ in Martha Fineman and 
Anna Grear (eds), Vulnerability: Reflections on a New Ethical Foundation for Law and Politics (Routledge 2014) 111.
2  M.S.S. v Belgium and Greece [GC] App no 30696/09 (ECtHR, 21 January 2011).
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asylum-seekers are ‘particularly vulnerable’3 by virtue of ‘the vulnerability inherent in [their] situ-
ation’,4 and therefore deserving of ‘special protection’ under the European Convention on Human 
Rights (ECHR).5 Yet, while M.S.S. may have further extended vulnerability’s reach into the arena 
of cross-border migration, the Grand Chamber’s late-2016 judgment in Khlaifia and Others v Italy6 
brought this extension to an abrupt halt. In Khlaifia, the Grand Chamber declined to recognise as 
vulnerable all those undertaking hazardous journeys across the Mediterranean, irrespective of the 
reasons for their migration, even though the Chamber took this position in its judgment in the case 
15 months prior.7 For the Grand Chamber, the journey, taken alone, was simply insufficient to estab-
lish particular vulnerability under the ECHR.
While regrettable, this outcome does not come as much of a surprise. As this article will show, the 
outcome is the natural, if flawed, result of the Grand Chamber continuing to latch onto a simplis-
tic, outdated, and arguably prejudicial, understanding of vulnerability, one which views individual 
vulnerability as contingent upon membership of an accepted vulnerable sub-population group. The 
consequence of the Grand Chamber’s refusal to fully embrace and apply a dynamic, more situational 
conceptualisation of vulnerability is two-fold. While this approach has reaffirmed the particular vul-
nerability of asylum-seekers, it has done so at the expense of the recognition of the lived vulnerability 
that is nonetheless experienced by those migrants who, having crossed the Mediterranean by precar-
ious means, do not then go on to claim asylum in Europe. This leaves non-asylum-seeking migrants 
particularly exposed, as it maintains their position at the very fringes of international human rights 
law,8 despite weighty humanitarian grounds for recognising the situational vulnerability that they 
experience on account of the journey.9
This article will begin by surveying the literature on vulnerability (Section 2), drawing upon the 
apparent ‘paradox’ of vulnerability as both categorical and universal,10 and examining analytical ap-
proaches that seek to more closely identify, understand and classify types and sources of vulnerabil-
ity. Second, attention will turn to the ECtHR’s understanding and use of the vulnerability concept 
both in general and in the context of the ongoing so-called ‘migration crisis’ (Section 3). The discus-
sion will draw on the emergence in M.S.S. of a two-pronged test of vulnerability tailored to the mi-
gration context (Section 3.2). This nascent test will be considered in the light of insights drawn from 
3  ibid para 232.
4  ibid para 233.
5  ibid para 251.
6  Khlaifia and Others v Italy [GC] App no 16483/12 (ECtHR, 15 December 2016).
7  Khlaifia and Others v Italy App no 16483/12 (ECtHR, 1 September 2015) para 135.
8  Sylvie Da Lomba, ‘Vulnerability, Irregular Migrants’ Health-Related Rights and the European Court of Human Rights’ 
(2014) 21(4) European Journal of Health Law 339, 342.
9  Amnesty International, Hotspot Italy: How EU’s Flagship Approach leads to Violations of Refugee and Migrant Rights (Am-
nesty International 2016) 32.
10  Lourdes Peroni and Alexandra Timmer, ‘Vulnerable Groups: The Promise of an Emerging Concept in European Human 
Rights Convention Law’ (2013) 11(4) International Journal of Constitutional Law 1056, 1058.
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literature, and its application by the Court in the Khlaifia judgments will then be explored (Section 
3.3). Examining and contrasting the differing conceptualisations of vulnerability advanced by the 
Chamber and the Grand Chamber, will elucidate and problematise the ECtHR’s approach(es) to and 
application of migrant vulnerability. The discussion will conclude (Section 4) with reflections on the 
repercussions for the human rights protection of both asylum-seeking and non-asylum-seeking mi-
grants, and thoughts on what this means for the ECtHR’s capacity to respond effectively to the ‘new 
challenge[s]’11 posed by increased migratory flows arriving at the borders of Europe by sea.
The work of Beduschi, Da Lomba, Flegar, Peroni and Timmer will be drawn upon throughout, as 
each has successfully linked the concept of vulnerability with human rights practice by means of 
exploring the jurisprudence of the ECtHR. However, insights will also be drawn from farther afield, 
specifically from (bio)ethics, as scholars in this and connected disciplines have been grappling with 
these very issues for some time, and as will be shown, such insights can prove particularly fruitful for 
the study of vulnerability and the law.12
2. Approaching vulnerability as a concept
References to vulnerability are found in popular discourse, law, policy and scholarship on a broad 
range of subject matters. Yet, as a concept, it enjoys little in the way of consensus, instead being char-
acterised by ambiguity and multiplicity.13 While much of the literature either explicitly or implicitly 
speaks of vulnerability as a universal characteristic of the human condition, within legal and policy 
frameworks vulnerability is often employed as a label,14 most commonly attributed to an individual 
pursuant to their ‘membership’ of a distinct sub-population group that is categorised as ‘vulnerable’.15 
As defined by Nickel, a vulnerable population is ‘a group of persons who, in virtue of some feature 
they share… are deserving of special protections’.16 Such features may include, inter alia, a suscep-
tibility to exploitation or harm, an inability to protect or safeguard one’s own interests, unequal op-
11  Khlaifia [GC] (n 6) para 241.
12  Indeed, Kenneth Kipnis, a leading vulnerability and ethics scholar, has expressly stated that work such as his, which is 
strictly concerned with the vulnerability of research subjects and not with what he terms ‘everyday vulnerabilities’, ‘surely has 
an importance extending beyond the boundaries of research ethics’. See Kenneth Kipnis, ‘Seven Vulnerabilities in the Pediatric 
Research Subject’ (2003) 24(2) Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics; and Kenneth Kipnis, ‘Vulnerability in Research Subjects: 
A Bioethical Taxonomy’, in National Bioethics Advisory Commission, Ethical and Policy Issues in Research Involving Human 
Participants (National Bioethics Advisory Commission, 2001).
13  Sana Loue and Bebe Loff, ‘Is there a Universal Understanding of Vulnerability? Experiences with Russian and Romanian 
Trainees in Research Ethics’ (2013) 8(5) Journal of Empirical on Human Research Ethics 17, 17.
14  Florenica Luna, ‘Elucidating the Concept of Vulnerability: Layers not Labels’ (2009) 2(1) International Journal of Femi-
nist Approaches to Bioethics 121, 123.
15  Florencia Luna and Sheryl Vanderpoel, ‘Not the Usual Suspects: Addressing Layers of Vulnerability’ (2013) 27(6) Bioeth-
ics 325, 326.
16  Philip Nickel, ‘Vulnerable Populations in Research’ (2006) 27(3) Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 245, 245.
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portunity, or a lack of basic rights.17 This traditional, categorical approach can be seen, for instance, 
in the 2013 European Union (EU) Reception Conditions Directive,18 Article 21 of which provides a 
non-exhaustive list of categories of persons who are considered vulnerable. These include, inter alia, 
(unaccompanied) minors, persons with disabilities, pregnant women, victims of human trafficking, 
and persons who have been subjected to serious forms of violence.19 
A similar reliance on the listing of vulnerable groups has been characterised by Bracken-Roche 
and others as ‘rampant’ within research ethics policies and guidelines, especially those in the health 
sciences.20 A case in point are the 2002 Council for International Organizations of Medical Scienc-
es (CIOMS) International Ethical Guidelines for Biomedical Research Involving Human Subjects.21 
The 2002 CIOMS Guidelines refer frequently to vulnerable groups or ‘classes’.22 Particular attention 
is given to what Luna has termed ‘a list of usual suspects’,23 which includes children,24 persons with 
mental or behavioural disorders,25 prisoners, homeless persons and refugees.26 As expressed in Nick-
el’s definition, designation as ‘vulnerable’ is important in a research setting because it affords such 
groups special protections and services not commonly available to the general population.27 Indeed, 
in the words of Ruof, ‘vulnerability is an abstract concept that has concrete effects both for those 
labelled vulnerable and for those not’.28 The same is true in law. Recognition as a vulnerable person 
for the purpose of the EU Reception Conditions Directive is critical for anyone seeking to rely on its 
provisions because ‘[o]nly vulnerable persons in accordance with Article 21 may be considered to 
have special reception needs and thus benefit from the specific support provided in accordance with 
[the] Directive’.29
17  Angela Martin, Nicolas Tavaglione and Samia Hurst, ‘Resolving the Conflict: Clarifying ‘Vulnerability’ in Health Care 
Ethics’ (2014) 24(1) Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 51, 52.
18  Directive 2013/33/EU of 26 June 2013 laying down the standards for the reception of applicants for international protec-
tion (recast) [2013] OJ L180/96 (Reception Conditions Directive).
19  ibid art 21.
20  Dearbhail Bracken-Roche, Emily Bell, Mary Ellen Macdonald and Eric Racine, ‘The Concept of ‘Vulnerability’ in Re-
search Ethics’ (2017) 15(8) Health Research Policy and Systems 8, 15.
21  CIOMS, International Ethical Guidelines for Biomedical Research Involving Human Subjects (3rd edn, CIOMS 2002). The 
Guidelines are prepared by CIOMS in collaboration with the World Health Organization (WHO).
22  ibid 64-66. Guideline 13: Research involving vulnerable persons (commentary).
23  Florencia Luna and Sheryl Vanderpoel, ‘Not the Usual Suspects: Addressing Layers of Vulnerability’ (2013) 27(6) Bioeth-
ics 325, 325.
24  CIOMS (n 21) 66-69. Guideline 14: Research involving children (commentary).
25  ibid 70-72. Guideline 15: Research involving individuals who by reason of mental or behavioural disorders are not capa-
ble of giving adequately informed consent (commentary).
26  ibid 64-66. Guideline 13: Research involving vulnerable persons (commentary).
27  Mary Ruof, ‘Vulnerability, Vulnerable Populations, and Policy’ (2004) 14(4) Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 411, 411.
28  ibid 412.
29  Reception Conditions Directive (n 18) art 22(3).
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For many scholars, categorical attributions of vulnerability are fundamentally flawed. Critics de-
nounce the approach for its exclusivity,30 its rigidity,31 its superficiality,32 its ambiguity,33 and for its 
reliance on a conceptual understanding of vulnerability that is both simplistic34 and vague.35 Levine 
and others put forward a particularly powerful critique of the flaws of the categorical vulnerability 
approach, and, more broadly, of the utility of the term ‘vulnerable’ itself.36 They raise three basic 
problems. First, the traditional understanding of vulnerability as categorical is too broad, as ‘so many 
categories of people are now considered vulnerable that virtually all potential human subjects are 
included’.37 Second, it is simultaneously too narrow, as exclusively emphasising group characteristics 
diverts attention away from contextual features.38 Third, it stereotypes, thereby essentialising entire 
groups through its failure to take into consideration pertinent differences that do exist between indi-
viduals within a particular group.39 As Aultman and others warn, to assign individuals to a particular 
group in this way can itself lead to exploitation and harm,40 as those who are labelled as vulnerable 
risk being stigmatised41 and becoming subject to ‘paternalistic protections’ that are ‘premised on the 
assumption that the vulnerable are incapable of protecting themselves’.42 Moreover, the failure of the 
categorical approach to see the individual not only stereotypes and essentialises within recognised 
vulnerable groups,43 but also has the effect of obscuring and denying protection for those who expe-
rience harm on account of other, unrecognised, vulnerabilities, such as poverty.44 This therefore calls 
into question the reliability of the categorical approach in identifying vulnerability and in protecting 
vulnerable individuals from harm.45
Yet, perhaps the most incising criticism comes from legal theory. The criticism advanced is that vul-
nerability cannot be viewed as categorical for it is universal. In contrast to the categorical approach 
of seeing pockets of vulnerability amongst an otherwise invulnerable general human population, 
30  Da Lomba (n 8) 344.
31  Luna and Vanderpoel (n 23) 326.
32  Bracken-Roche and others (n 20) 15-16.
33  Kipnis (n 12) G1.
34  Luna and Vanderpoel (n 23) 326.
35  Debra DeBruin, ‘Looking Beyond the Limitations of “Vulnerability”: Reforming Safeguards in Research’ (2004) 4(3) The 
American Journal of Bioethics 76, 76.
36  Carol Levine, Ruth Faden, Christine Grady, Dale Hammerschmidt, Lisa Eckenwiler and Jeremy Sugarman, ‘The Limita-
tions of “Vulnerability” as a Protection for Human Research Participants’ (2004) 4(3) The American Journal of Bioethics 44.
37  ibid 46.
38  ibid.
39  ibid 47.
40  Julie Aultman, ‘Vulnerability: Its Meaning and Value in the Context of Contemporary Bioethics’ (2014) 14(12) The 
American Journal of Bioethics 15, 16.
41  Florencia Luna, ‘Vulnerability, an Interesting Concept for Public Health: The Case of Older Persons’ (2014) 7(2) Public 
Health Ethics 180, 182.
42  DeBruin (n 35) 77.
43  Da Lomba (n 8) 343.
44  Aultman (n 40) 16.
45  Levine and others (n 36) 44.
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for Fineman and for many others, vulnerability is ‘a universal, inevitable, enduring aspect of the 
human condition’.46 To be human is to be vulnerable, and to be vulnerable is to be in ‘a state of con-
stant possibility of harm’.47 Vulnerability cannot therefore be seen as something associated with only 
certain population groups;48 indeed, the very idea of human invulnerability is exposed as a fallacy.49 
Yet Fineman’s thesis, while emphasising universality, also recognises vulnerability’s particularity.50 
Specifically, an individual’s experience of vulnerability is unique for it is influenced simultaneously 
by both one’s distinctive position ‘within a web of economic and institutional relationships’ and one’s 
access to and possession of resources.51 
Still, the universal approach itself is not immune to criticism. While the categorical approach has 
been branded as exclusive, the universal approach has been criticised for being over-inclusive. In the 
most stinging critique, Levine and others assert that ‘[i]f everyone is vulnerable then the concept be-
comes too nebulous to be meaningful’.52 For Luna, the universal ‘existential approach’ is as dangerous 
as the categorical ‘essentialist approach’ because both risk ‘naturalising’ vulnerability, in other words, 
‘if everyone is equally and essentially vulnerable, no one is specifically vulnerable’.53 The universal ap-
proach has therefore been denounced for neither ‘acknowledg[ing] the special perils faced by some’54 
nor providing an adequate explanation for why special protection is in practice not afforded to all.55 
In this connection, Hurst argues simply that ‘[a] definition that includes humanity itself… cannot 
provide reason for special protection’.56
While it has been argued that there is ‘no inherent impediment’ to reconciling the categorical and 
universal approaches at a conceptual level,57 at the practical level this has proven far less straight-
forward.58 Within the (bio)ethics literature, scholars including Luna, and Rogers, Mackenzie and 
Dodds, have turned to analytical approaches in an effort to bring greater nuance to the theory of 
vulnerability,59 and to thereby operationalise it as a ‘conceptual tool’.60 Such analyses seek to focus 
more precisely on identifying characteristics that can render individuals vulnerable, in other words, 
46  Martha Fineman, ‘The Vulnerable Subject: Anchoring Equality in the Human Condition’ (2008) 20(1) Yale Journal of 
Law & Feminism 1, 8. 
47  ibid 11.
48  Timmer (n 1) 112.
49  Martha Albertson Fineman and Anna Grear, ‘Introduction: Vulnerability as Heuristic – An Invitation to Future Explo-
ration’ in Martha Fineman and Anna Grear (eds), Vulnerability: Reflections on a New Ethical Foundation for Law and Politics 
(Routledge 2014) 11.
50  Fineman (n 46) 10.
51  ibid.
52  Levine and others (n 36) 46.
53  Luna (n 41) 182 (emphasis in original).
54  DeBruin (n 35) 76.
55  Martin and others (n 17) 52.
56  Samia Hurst, ‘Vulnerability in Research and Health Care; Describing the Elephant in the Room?’ (2008) 22(4) Bioethics 
191, 192 (emphasis in original).
57  Peroni and Timmer (n 10) 1060; Da Lomba (n 8) 349.
58  Wendy Rogers, Catriona Mackenzie and Susan Dodds, ‘Introduction’ (2012) 5(2) International Journal of Feminist Ap-
proaches to Bioethics 1, 2.
59  Wendy Rogers, Catriona Mackenzie and Susan Dodds, ‘Why Bioethics Needs a Concept of Vulnerability’ (2012) 5(2) 
International Journal of Feminist Approaches to Bioethics 11, 26.
60  Luna (n 14) 123.
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its sources,61 and assessing their impact.62 Such characteristics, or ‘vulnerability markers’,63 include 
not only personal characteristics of the individual, but also the nature of one’s social, legal, political 
and economic environment,64 which together help emphasise both vulnerability’s relationality65 and 
mutability.66
Of particular utility in the migration at sea context is the vulnerability taxonomy proposed by Rog-
ers, Mackenzie and Dodds.67 Their approach seeks to identify and classify sources of vulnerability 
and associated duties that exist towards those recognised as vulnerable.68 The taxonomy is formed of 
three overlapping kinds of vulnerability. These are inherent, situational, and pathogenic vulnerabili-
ty,69 all of which are present in the migration at sea context. 
The first, inherent vulnerability, echoes Fineman’s thesis. It is concerned with vulnerabilities that 
‘arise from our corporeality, our neediness, our dependence on others, and our affective and social 
natures’, in other words, vulnerabilities inherent in the human condition.70 The second, situational 
sources, are context-specific. They are ‘caused or exacerbated by the personal, social, political, eco-
nomic, or environmental situation of a person or social group’.71 Such sources may exist either in 
the short or long term and may occur either once or on multiple occasions.72 The third, pathogenic 
sources, emanate from ‘dysfunctional social or personal relationships’,73 in other words from rela-
tionships characterised by, inter alia, prejudice, abuse, persecution or injustice.74 Pathogenic vulner-
abilities may also occur when well-intended protection policies either exacerbate existing vulnera-
bilities75 or generate new vulnerabilities.76 Rogers, Mackenzie and Dodds then take their taxonomy 
one stage further by arguing that these three sources of vulnerability can be experienced in one of 
61  Margaret Meek Lange, Wendy Rogers and Susan Dodds, ‘Vulnerability in Research Ethics: A Way Forward’ (2013) 27(6) 
Bioethics 333, 335.
62  Rogers and others, ‘Why Bioethics Needs a Concept of Vulnerability’ (n 59) 16; DeBruin (n 35) 77.
63  Meek Lange and others (n 61) 334.
64  Franck Duvell, Anna Triandafyllidou and Bastian Vollmer, ‘Ethical Issues in Irregular Migration Research in Europe’ 
(2010) 16(1) Population, Space and Place 227, 232.
65  Luna (n 14) 129; Meek Lange and others (n 61) 335.
66  DeBruin (n 35) 77.
67  Rogers and others, ‘Why Bioethics Needs a Concept of Vulnerability’ (n 59) 24.
68  Meek Lange and others (n 61) 336 and 340.
69  Rogers and others, ‘Why Bioethics Needs a Concept of Vulnerability’ (n 59) 24.
70  ibid.
71  ibid.
72  ibid.
73  Meek Lange and others (n 61) 336.
74  ibid.
75  Rogers and others, ‘Why Bioethics Needs a Concept of Vulnerability’ (n 59) 25.
76  Meek Lange and others (n 61) 336.
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two states – either dispositionally or occurrently.77 To take being at sea as an example.78 All human 
beings are dispositionally vulnerable at sea, yet most of us will never find ourselves in a situation in 
which we are occurrently vulnerable at sea. Even when at sea, the vast majority of us will benefit from 
the safety provided by being on an appropriate seagoing craft. This is in stark contrast to those who 
find themselves in ill-equipped, overcrowded crafts unsuited to making long journeys across large 
expanses of water.
In sum, analytical approaches to vulnerability are useful as they not only assist in better integrat-
ing the universal and context-specific interpretations of vulnerability,79 but also provide a way to 
better direct attention towards what Rogers, Mackenzie and Dodds have called ‘more than ordinary 
vulnerability’.80 However, it must be borne in mind that although taxonomies may help to provide 
more ‘concrete’ guidance, such guidance can only ever be seen as ‘general’.81 While the taxonomy 
can be utilised as a framework through which to view vulnerability in its many manifestations, the 
theory does not, and cannot, provide all of the answers, especially when it comes to determining 
where the threshold lies between ‘ordinary’ and ‘more than ordinary’ vulnerability. The decision as 
to where this threshold lies, and therefore the decision as to who should be owed ‘special protection’ 
on account of their vulnerability, rests with the decision-makers. Turning therefore to now look spe-
cifically at the ECtHR, the vulnerability taxonomy of Rogers, Mackenzie and Dodds will be used to 
examine the manner in which the concept of vulnerability has been employed by the Court as a tool 
to determine who should be owed ‘special protection’ under the ECHR generally, and in respect to 
migration specifically.
3. Examining migrant vulnerability at the ECtHR
3.1 Unpacking the ECtHR’s general approach to vulnerability
While the term ‘vulnerable’ has been a feature of the ECtHR’s lexicon for decades,82 the Court has 
been engaging far more frequently with the concept in recent years.83 Signalling perhaps an at least 
implicit appreciation of the universality of human vulnerability,84 the Court has often used a range 
77  Margaret Meek Lange, ‘Vulnerability as a Concept for Health Systems Research’ (2014) 14(2) Ethical Review of Health 
Services Research 41, 42.
78  Rogers and others (n 59) give the example of hunger. On page 24, they explain that while all ‘[a]ll human beings are 
dispositionally vulnerable to hunger… most of those of us who live in affluent countries are not occurrently vulnerable to 
life-threatening hunger on a daily basis, unlike a significant proportion of the world’s population who lack the resources to 
supply their daily nutritional needs’.
79  Rogers and others, ‘Introduction’ (n 58) 3-4.
80  Rogers and others (n 59) 24.
81  Meek Lange and others (n 61) 337.
82  See multiple references to vulnerability in Dudgeon v UK App no 7525/76 (ECtHR, 22 October 1981).
83  Veronika Flegar, ‘Vulnerability and the Principle of Non-Refoulement in the European Court of Human Rights’ (2016) 
8(2) Contemporary Readings in Law and Social Justice 148, 153.
84  On this point, Peroni and Timmer report that a Strasbourg judge confirmed as much, stating that ‘All applicants are 
vulnerable, but some are more vulnerable than others’. See Peroni and Timmer (n 10) 1060. 
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of preceding qualifying terms directly prior to the term ‘vulnerable’. These have included ‘specially’,85 
‘highly’,86 ‘extremely’87 and ‘particularly’,88 with the latter being especially common.89 It nevertheless 
remains somewhat unclear as to when and why an applicant will be deemed ‘particularly vulnerable’ 
in the eyes of the Court,90  the Court having provided neither a precise definition nor a coherent set 
of vulnerability ‘criteria’.91 Scholarly analyses have though given some insight into how the concept is 
understood by the Court.
Analysing Timmer’s thematisation of the Court’s use of the term vulnerable92 through the lens of the 
vulnerability taxonomy of Rogers, Mackenzie and Dodds reveals that the Court recognises inherent 
vulnerabilities, in particular, of children and persons with mental disabilities, as well as situational 
sources of vulnerability, for instance, being in detention or in a domestic violence setting.93 Moreover, 
Timmer identifies in the Court’s jurisprudence what she calls ‘compounded vulnerability’.94 On such 
occasions, the Court recognises an applicant as being vulnerable on multiple grounds, or to use the 
language of Luna, presenting with multiple layers, which may be both inherent and situational. For 
example, in V.C. v Italy,95 in finding that the applicant was in a situation of ‘particular vulnerability’,96 
the Court considered both the applicant’s inherent vulnerability as a 15-year-old minor97 and ‘the 
particular situation of vulnerability, both moral and physical’ in which she found herself.98 Tim-
mer further observes that in some such cases ‘compounded vulnerability’ may result in a seemingly 
more pronounced vulnerability, which has been termed by the Court as ‘extreme’, ‘double’ or ‘great’.99 
This was notably the case in the Court’s judgment in Mubilanzila Mayeka and Kaniki Mitunga v 
Belgium.100 In Mubilanzila Mayeka, the Court found that a five-year-old, unaccompanied, irregular 
migrant was ‘in an extremely vulnerable situation’,101 and that there had been a consequent violation 
of Article 3 on account of her detention for two months in an adult detention facility.102
85  Dudgeon (n 82) para 62.
86  Centre for Legal Resources on behalf of Valentin Câmpeanu v Romania [GC] App no 47848/08 (ECtHR, 17 July 2014) para 
104.
87  Mubilanzila Mayeka and Kaniki Mitunga v Belgium App no 13178/03 (ECtHR, 12 October 2006) para 55.
88  Yordanova and Others v Bulgaria App no 25446/06 (ECtHR, 24 April 2012) para 130.
89  It is, however, important to note that, while in the vast majority of cases the Court has used a preceding qualifying term 
such as ‘particular’, its use of such terms is not entirely consistent. For example, in Kiyutin (n 112), while the Court unequivo-
cally asserts in paragraph 74 that the applicant, as a person with HIV, ‘belonged to a particularly vulnerable group’, earlier, in 
paragraph 64, the Court simply refers to persons living with HIV as ‘a vulnerable group’.
90  Flegar (n 83) 157.
91  Da Lomba (n 8) 343.
92  Timmer (n 1) 112.
93  ibid 114-118.
94  ibid 118.
95  App no 54227/14 (ECtHR, 1 February 2018).
96  ibid para 110.
97  ibid para 89.
98  ibid para 110.
99  Timmer (n 1) 118.
100  Mubilanzila Mayeka (n 87).
101  ibid paras 55 and 103.
102  ibid paras 50 and 59.
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However, although in judgments such as V.C. the Court has approached the question of vulner-
ability in the light of the specific circumstances of the applicant, Timmer, both individually and in 
her work with Peroni, has emphasised the Court’s particular reliance upon ‘vulnerable groups’,103 or 
in other words, the categorical approach, in its vulnerability reasoning. This is especially the case in 
judgments concerning minority rights and discrimination. In its landmark judgment in Chapman v 
UK,104 the Court, despite finding no violations of any of the Convention articles raised,105 explicitly 
accepted ‘the vulnerable position of Gypsies as a minority’.106 Since Chapman, the ECtHR has recog-
nised the vulnerability of other sub-population groups, including, as already mentioned, children107 
and persons with mental disabilities,108 as well as, in Kiyutin v Russia,109 persons living with HIV.110 In 
Kiyutin, the ECtHR gave some indication as to the rationale behind its vulnerable groups approach, 
explaining that ‘such groups were historically subject to prejudice with lasting consequences, result-
ing in their social exclusion’.111 Similarly, in Alajos Kiss v Hungary,112 the Court stated that ‘particular-
ly vulnerable group[s] in society… have suffered considerable discrimination in the past’.113 
While these statements are insightful, they cannot be taken as ultimately determinative of which 
groups will or will not be considered vulnerable by the ECtHR because not all groups whose vulner-
ability has been recognised by the Court fit within this particular reasoning, for instance children. 
Indeed, in respect to children, Timmer pinpoints the Court’s references to dependency on others 
and an inability to complain about abuse as both being sources of their ‘inherent and constant’ vul-
nerability.114 
Identification by the ECtHR as vulnerable is highly important because such recognition can have 
substantial implications in respect to the level of protection afforded by the Convention. As Beduschi 
observes, although the ECtHR does not create new obligations per se, it does utilise vulnerability ‘as 
a magnifying glass, exposing a greater duty to protect and care imposed upon States’.115 For example, 
in Alajos Kiss, the Court stated that ‘if a restriction on fundamental rights applies to a particularly 
vulnerable group in society… then the State’s margin of appreciation is substantially narrower and 
103  Timmer (n 1) 111; Peroni and Timmer (n 10) 1056.
104  [GC] App no 27238/95 (ECtHR, 18 January 2001).
105  ibid paras 116, 120, 125 and 130.
106  ibid para 96.
107  Okkali v Turkey App no 52067/99 (ECtHR, 17 October 2006) para 70.
108  Renolde v France App no 5608/05 (ECtHR, 16 October 2008) para 84.
109  App no 2700/10 (ECtHR, 10 March 2011).
110  ibid para 64.
111  ibid para 63.
112  App no 38832/06 (ECtHR, 20 May 2010).
113  ibid para 42.
114  Timmer (n 1) 114.
115  Ana Beduschi, ‘Vulnerability on Trial: Protection of Migrant Children’s Rights in the Jurisprudence of International 
Human Rights Courts’ (2018) 36(1) Boston University International Law Journal 55, 85.
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it must have very weighty reasons for the restrictions in question’.116 In Chapman, the Court found 
there to be a positive obligation on contracting states ‘to facilitate the Gypsy way of life’,117 and in Va-
liulienė v Lithuania,118 the Court stated that ‘given the particular vulnerability of women affected by 
domestic violence, a heightened degree of vigilance was required by the State’.119
It is clear therefore that recognition as vulnerable under the Convention has important conse-
quences for the level of protection afforded to certain applicants and for the obligations incumbent 
upon contracting states. It is also apparent that the Court has, in extending the vulnerability concept 
to a broader range of applicants relied heavily, albeit not exclusively, on a categorical approach that 
attaches vulnerability to certain groups.120 In the light of these general findings, this discussion now 
turns to examine precisely how the concept of vulnerability has been deployed by the ECtHR in 
respect to the Mediterranean migration context, chiefly with discussion of the Court’s judgments in 
M.S.S. and Khlaifia.
3.2 M.S.S. – a nascent test of vulnerability in the Mediterranean migration context
It was in M.S.S. that the ECtHR for the first time identified asylum-seekers as ‘a particularly un-
derprivileged and vulnerable population group in need of special protection’.121 M.S.S. concerned the 
treatment of an Afghan male national who, having first entered the EU via Greece, travelled to Bel-
gium, only to then be transferred back to Greece upon attempting to seek asylum in Belgium.122 The 
applicant claimed, inter alia, that his detention at Athens International Airport and his subsequent 
living conditions in Greece amounted to inhuman and degrading treatment.123 In respect to his living 
conditions, the applicant alleged that he had for months been residing in a ‘state of extreme pover-
ty’.124 In its judgment, the Court attached ‘considerable importance’ to the fact that the applicant had 
sought asylum.125 Specifically, in coming to its finding of a violation of Article 3, the Grand Chamber 
stated that ‘the applicant’s distress was accentuated by the vulnerability inherent in his situation as an 
asylum-seeker’.126
The M.S.S. judgment has been well-received in many quarters.127 Peroni finds ‘the line of reasoning 
put forward by the majority… opens up the idea of vulnerability to other circumstances and oth-
116  Alajos Kiss (n 112) para 42.
117  Chapman (n 104) para 96.
118  App no 33234/07 (ECtHR, 26 March 2013).
119  ibid para 51.
120  Timmer (n 1) 114.
121  M.S.S. (n 2) para 251.
122  ibid paras 11-12 and 33.
123  ibid paras 205-206 and 235.
124  ibid paras 235-239.
125  ibid para 251.
126  ibid para 233 (emphasis added). Note that the Court here uses the term ‘inherent’ in respect to all that is inherent in the 
status of an asylum-seeker as opposed to all that is inherent in the human condition, per Rogers and others (n 59).
127  For a thoughtful appraisal, see Marie-Bénédicte Dembour, When Humans Become Migrants (OUP 2015) 402-441.
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er groups’.128 Never before had the ECtHR so emphatically supported the rights of asylum-seekers 
in general, and ‘[n]ever before… had living conditions of extreme poverty been found to give rise 
to state responsibility under Article 3’.129 In order to achieve these advances, the Court relied sub-
stantially upon a bespoke test of vulnerability tailored to the forced migration context. The Court 
identified two sources, or prongs, of the applicant’s vulnerability as an asylum-seeker. The first was 
‘everything he had been through during his migration’ (migratory experience), and the second was 
‘the traumatic experiences he was likely to have endured previously’ (prior trauma).130 The Court 
left undefined what it meant precisely by ‘everything he had been through during his migration’ 
and ‘traumatic experiences’, however, these are surely open to broad interpretation in the light of the 
blanket manner with which the Court attributed these to all asylum-seekers. ‘[E]verything’ that an 
asylum-seeker has ‘been through during [their] migration’ may surely encompass not only reception 
conditions and characteristics of the receiving state’s asylum system, but also all that was experienced 
during the actual journey itself. For instance, the cramped and unsanitary conditions experienced 
on an overcrowded seagoing craft, a lack of privacy and basic supplies, the sense of precarity and 
uncertainty associated with a long and dangerous journey by sea, and acute exposure to the ele-
ments, especially at night. Such an approach can in fact be seen in the UNHCR’s 2016 Vulnerability 
Screening Tool, which explicitly recognises vulnerabilities arising either in the home country, during 
the journey, upon arrival, or through the legal and administrative processes in the arrival country.131
Viewing these two sources through the lens of the vulnerability taxonomy of Rogers, Mackenzie 
and Dodds, it becomes apparent that this is a heavily situational test. Both sources primarily stem 
not from the inherent nature of the applicant but from the situation in which the applicant found 
himself. The test is open to temporary forms of vulnerability and is flexible enough to recognise 
pathogenic sources as a sub-type of this situational vulnerability. Such pathogenic sources could here 
include the prejudice, injustice and persecution that the applicant likely experienced, as well as the 
exacerbation of his situational vulnerability on account of the Greek authorities’ failure to act. How-
ever, while the sources of vulnerability here are strongly situational, and while the Court in M.S.S. 
did, on the whole, conduct an individualised assessment of the applicant’s situation, it is nevertheless 
clear that the manner in which the Court applied vulnerability to the applicant was unmistakeably 
categorical. This was as a consequence of the Court affiliating the two-pronged test with the ‘status’ 
of the applicant as an asylum-seeker.132 Moreover, by recognising vulnerability as ‘inherent in his 
128  Lourdes Peroni, ‘M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece: When is a Group Vulnerable?’ (Strasbourg Observers, 11 February 2011) 
<strasbourgobservers.com/2011/02/10/m-s-s-v-belgium-and-greece-when-is-a-group-vulnerable> accessed 15 May 2018.
129  Flegar (n 83) 157.
130  M.S.S. (n 2) para 232.
131  UNHCR, Vulnerability Screening Tool (UNHCR and IDC 2016) 2. This position is though in contrast to Brandl and Czech 
who do more narrowly construe this statement as referring to only ‘the specific problems asylum-seekers face in their struggle 
to make a living while awaiting the decision on their request for international protection’. See Ulrike Brandl and Philip Czech, 
‘General and Specific Vulnerability of Protection-Seekers in the EU: Is There an Adequate Response to their Needs?’ in Fran-
cesco Ippolito and Sara Iglesias Sánchez (eds), Protecting Vulnerable Groups: The European Human Rights Framework (Hart 
2015) 250.
132  M.S.S. (n 2) para 251.
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situation as an asylum-seeker’,133 the Court sweepingly attributed particular vulnerability to all asy-
lum-seekers ‘as though it were an inherent attribute of the entire class’.134 This thus brings to the fore 
the concerns advanced in the literature in respect to essentialism, paternalism and stigmatisation, 
and also raises questions about the reliability of the test in recognising vulnerability, more on which 
will be discussed below.
It is indeed clear that the M.S.S. judgment has been highly influential. It is also apparent that this 
nascent vulnerability test has gained significant traction. The Court has on numerous occasions since 
reaffirmed its position that asylum-seekers constitute a ‘particularly… vulnerable population group 
in need of special protection’, this being on account of the two grounds listed in M.S.S.135 In fact, in 
Mahamed Jama v Malta,136 the Court clarified this further by announcing that the particular vulner-
ability of asylum-seekers is ‘a state of vulnerability which exists irrespective of other health concerns 
or age factors’.137 However, the precise form and reach of the test has remained somewhat undefined. 
Indeed, while in many of the subsequent cases the applicants have, at the material time, been seeking 
asylum and awaiting a decision on their claim, this was not the case in Khlaifia.
3.3 Khlaifia – vulnerability on account of the journey (alone)?
3.3.1 Conflicting judgments
In Khlaifia, the Court was called upon to adjudicate on the receiving and holding (to be read as 
‘detaining’) of three Tunisian non-asylum-seeking migrants (the applicants) by Italian authorities, 
first, at the Early Reception and Aid Centre (CSPA) at Contrada Imbriacola on the island of Lampe-
dusa,138 and second, on ships moored in Palermo harbour, Sicily,139 as well as the subsequent return 
(to be read as ‘expulsion’) of the applicants to Tunisia in accordance with ‘simplified procedures’ 
bilaterally entered into by the two states.140 The applicants, all males aged in their twenties, had each 
been travelling on board rudimentary vessels across the Mediterranean when they were intercepted 
by the Italian coastguard.141 After spending a few days on Lampedusa, the applicants were flown to 
Palermo.142 They remained in Palermo, again for only a few days,143 before being returned to Tunis.144
133  ibid para 233.
134  Peroni and Timmer (n 10) 1068.
135  For example, S.H.H. v UK App no 60367/10 (ECtHR, 29 January 2013) para 76; and A.S. v Switzerland App no 39350/13 
(ECtHR, 30 June 2015) para 29.
136  App no 10290/13 (ECtHR, 26 November 2015).
137  ibid para 100.
138  Khlaifia [GC] (n 6) para 12.
139  ibid para 15.
140  ibid paras 36-40.
141  ibid paras 10-11.
142  ibid paras 11-15.
143  ibid para 17.
144  ibid para 21.
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In both of the judgments in the case, that is, in the judgment of the Chamber and in the judgment 
of the Grand Chamber, vulnerability performed a brief but crucial role.145 As in M.S.S., in Khlaifia, 
the question of vulnerability was raised in relation to an alleged violation of Article 3,146 specifically 
the detention conditions at the CSPA.147 The applicants complained of overcrowding, poor sleeping 
arrangements, and unacceptable conditions of hygiene and sanitation.148 For the Chamber, the evi-
dence before it revealed standards that had fallen short of the requirements prescribed by Article 3.149 
However, before either the Chamber or the Grand Chamber came to a finding as to whether or not 
there had been a violation of Article 3, both considered the duration of the applicants’ detention. It 
was indeed uncontested that the applicants had been held at the CSPA for a short period of two to 
three days.150 Both the Chamber and the Grand Chamber accepted that the short duration of the ap-
plicants’ detention meant that ‘their limited contact with the outside world could not therefore have 
had serious consequences for their personal situations’.151 The Grand Chamber also distinguished 
the case from those previous cases in which it had found violations of Article 3 ‘in spite of the short 
duration of the deprivation of liberty in question’,152 doing so on the grounds that, in those cases, the 
conditions of detention had been particularly poor, even ‘atrocious’.153 The applicants nevertheless 
stressed the following:
that at the material time they had just survived a dangerous crossing of the Mediterranean by night 
in a rubber dinghy, and that this had weakened them physically and psychologically. They had thus 
been in a situation of vulnerability, accentuated by the fact that their deprivation of liberty had no 
legal basis, and their mental distress had increased as a result.154
The applicants were here drawing on both situational and pathogenic sources of vulnerability, re-
marking in particular on how the actions of the Italian authorities had exacerbated, rather than alle-
viated, their ‘situation of vulnerability’. The Chamber agreed. The applicants were vulnerable. More-
over, in the Chamber’s view, there had been a violation of Article 3.155 For the Chamber it was a ‘fact 
that the applicants… were in a situation of vulnerability’.156 In line with the argument put forward 
by the applicants, the Chamber found that this ‘situation of vulnerability’ was on account of their 
145  ibid para 194; Khlaifia (n 7) para 135.
146  In total, the applicants alleged nine separate violations of four substantive rights – arts 3, 5, 13 and art 4 of protocol no. 4.
147  Khlaifia [GC] (n 6) para 136.
148  ibid paras 142-144.
149  Khlaifia (n 7) para 134.
150  Khlaifia [GC] (n 6) para 14.
151  ibid para 195; Khlaifia (n 7) para 135.
152  Khlaifia [GC] (n 6) para 196.
153  ibid.
154  Khlaifia [GC] (n 6) para 143.
155  Khlaifia (n 7) paras 135-136. By five votes to two.
156  ibid para 135.
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having ‘just undergone a dangerous journey on the high seas’.157 Having accepted that the applicants 
had been in a vulnerable situation, the Chamber then conducted what was essentially a balancing 
exercise between the short duration on one side and the applicants’ vulnerability on the other.158 It 
found that the short duration of the applicants’ stay in the CSPA was outweighed by their vulnerabil-
ity. As such, ‘[t]heir confinement in conditions which impaired their human dignity thus constituted 
degrading treatment in breach of Article 3’.159 For the Grand Chamber, however, no such balancing 
exercise was required. The applicants were not vulnerable and there was no violation of Article 3.160 
While the Grand Chamber recognised that ‘the applicants were weakened physically and psycho-
logically because they had just made a dangerous crossing of the Mediterranean’,161 it nevertheless 
qualified this by emphasising that the applicants had not sought asylum during the ‘not insignificant 
period’ they had been in Italy.162 As the applicants were not asylum-seekers, they consequently ‘did 
not have the specific vulnerability inherent in that status’.163 The Grand Chamber thereby concluded 
that neither the treatment of the detainees nor the conditions of their detention at the CSPA violated 
Article 3.164
3.3.2 Conflicting conceptualisations
It is clear from both Khlaifia judgments that the journey is relevant, per the first prong of the M.S.S. 
test (migratory experience). Both the Chamber and the Grand Chamber appreciated that the appli-
cants had undergone, and had been detrimentally affected by, a ‘dangerous’ migratory journey. The 
difference between the two judgments, however, lies in whether the journey alone is sufficient to 
establish vulnerability under the ECHR. For the Chamber, the applicants’ vulnerability had a single 
source, the journey, the danger of which was enough to render them vulnerable and to provide suffi-
cient weight to in effect lower the minimum threshold needed to find a violation of Article 3. Moreo-
ver, timing is crucial, as it cannot be assumed that such vulnerability is permanent. In the Chamber’s 
view the applicants were vulnerable at the material time, meaning that their detention, which was 
effective almost immediately upon their arrival on Lampedusa, occurred at a time when they were 
‘Convention vulnerable’.
The conceptualisation of vulnerability proffered by the Chamber was, without doubt, progressive, 
at least within the ECtHR’s jurisprudence. For the majority, neither the legal status nor the political 
identity of the applicants was of issue when it came to the question of vulnerability. By taking this 
approach, the Chamber was able to release the M.S.S. two-pronged test from any restrictions that had 
been placed upon it as a consequence of it having been attached to the status of an asylum-seeker. Yet, 
157  ibid.
158  ibid.
159  ibid.
160  Khlaifia [GC] (n 6) paras 199-200.
161  ibid para 194.
162  ibid para 249.
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the Grand Chamber, and indeed the minority in the Chamber,165 elected to stick resolutely to a purely 
categorical application of the test. That the applicants failed to fall within any of the sub-population 
groups previously identified as vulnerable under the ECHR was fatal to their claim. Not only were the 
applicants not asylum-seekers,166 they also ‘belonged neither to the category of elderly persons nor to 
that of minors… did not claim to be suffering from any particular medical condition. Nor did they 
complain of any lack of medical care’.167 In the words of Judge Raimondi, the applicants, who were 
aged in their mid-twenties,168 were of ‘young age and good health’.169 The Grand Chamber thereby 
reverted to its most traditional, categorical approach, thus belying the nuance and conceptual so-
phistication that underpins the two-pronged M.S.S. test. While the Grand Chamber may have again 
reaffirmed the inherent and particular vulnerability of asylum-seekers, it has done so in a manner 
that unequivocally excludes non-asylum-seeking migrants from the Convention’s ‘special protection’.
At least for now, the Grand Chamber has squandered the opportunity to move towards a more 
nuanced, mutable conceptualisation of vulnerability that better responds to the lived experience of 
those making the hazardous journey across the Mediterranean, whatever the reason or reasons for 
their journey. Yet in addition to this, the Grand Chamber’s Khlaifia judgment has also had an impor-
tant impact on the scope of the M.S.S. test, an impact that seemingly narrows and thereby restricts 
the test in two particular, overlapping ways.
First, it appears to amend the second prong (prior trauma). As mentioned, both prongs of the 
M.S.S. test were left open to broad interpretation. Yet, while the express wording in M.S.S. was ‘be-
cause of… the traumatic experiences he was likely to have endured previously’,170 in Khlaifia, the 
Court made explicit reference to the fact that the applicants ‘did not claim to have endured traumatic 
experiences in their country of origin’.171 While it can be argued that this requirement that the trauma 
be endured in the ‘country of origin’ was always implicit in the test, this being because the test was 
detailed in the express light of an asylum-seeking migrant, it is nevertheless the case that this qual-
ification did not explicitly feature in the initial test. The effect of this ‘clarification’ is to narrow the 
possible interpretation of the second prong, framing it more unequivocally as a test that applies only 
to those seeking asylum.
Second, it hints towards an imbalance in the test. On the face of it, the Grand Chamber’s Khlaifia 
judgment appears to lend further support to the M.S.S. vulnerability test as a two-pronged test. Both 
prongs were explicitly considered in the judgment, and while it was acknowledged that the applicants 
had undertaken a ‘dangerous journey’, the fact that they had ‘not claim[ed] to have endured traumat-
ic experiences’172 was fatal to their claim. As such, and in accordance with the test being two-pronged, 
165  Khlaifia (n 7) partly dissenting opinion of Judges Sajó and Vučinić, paras 53-58.
166  Khlaifia [GC] (n 6) para 194.
167  ibid.
168  ibid.
169  ibid, concurring opinion of Judge Raimondi, para 5. The words of Judge Raimondi are indeed most interesting given that 
he was on the side of the majority judgment in the Chamber.
170  M.S.S. (n 2) para 232.
171  Khlaifia [GC] (n 6) para 194.
172  ibid.
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non-fulfilment of the second prong (prior trauma) meant that the test had not been met and the 
applicants were not ‘particularly vulnerable’ under the ECHR. However, what the Khlaifia Grand 
Chamber judgment also helps reveal is an apparent prioritisation of the second M.S.S. prong (prior 
trauma) over the first (migratory experience). As mentioned, in M.S.S., the Grand Chamber tied the 
two-prong test to what it pronounced as the ‘inherent’ vulnerability of asylum-seekers. The Grand 
Chamber therefore effectively declared that all asylum-seekers automatically satisfy the two prongs, 
and that therefore all asylum-seekers are vulnerable as a result of the journey and as a result of prior 
traumatic experiences. Yet, to take each prong in turn, while the second (prior trauma) is indeed 
likely to be typical, albeit not unique, to the situation of asylum-seekers, the first (migratory experi-
ence) is by no means exclusive to those seeking asylum, as is made apparent by the facts in Khlaifia. 
Additionally, by no means can it automatically be assumed that an individual who is seeking asylum 
has undergone a ‘dangerous’ journey in order to seek asylum – indeed, this does not form a pre-req-
uisite for the recognition of refugee status. As such, although the applicant in M.S.S. did satisfy both 
prongs of the test, it seems perfectly plausible that a situation may arise in which an asylum-seeker 
may not necessarily meet the first prong of the test, that is vulnerability on account of the journey, 
but would nevertheless be recognised as vulnerable under the ECHR due to the Grand Chamber’s 
position that all asylum-seekers are to be ‘unconditionally’173 recognised as such. Yet, conversely, as 
shown by Khlaifia, meeting the first prong (migratory journey) but not the second (prior trauma) 
fails to establish particular vulnerability. 
It could of course be argued that the first prong is simply so open-ended, per the use of the word 
‘everything’, that it would always be met by all asylum-seekers regardless of the precise nature of their 
journey, remembering of course that the journey is only one aspect to be taken into consideration in 
this respect. Yet, even if this is the case, an imbalance would still occur because while the first prong 
(migratory journey) would be open to a broad interpretation, the second (prior trauma) would be 
so narrowly interpreted as to in effect restrict it to asylum-seekers only. This imbalance, along with 
the clarification of the first prong, provides further evidence of the Court retaining a traditional 
understanding of vulnerability. Despite the Grand Chamber itself having identified vulnerability in 
the Mediterranean migration context as two-pronged, the second, prior traumatic experience, now 
specifically in the country of origin, appears to be prioritised over the first, everything that is experi-
enced during migration, including the journey.
In sum, the Grand Chamber’s approach to vulnerability in the Mediterranean migration context 
is categorical par excellence. While the ECtHR may to some degree appreciate the universality of 
human vulnerability, while it does typically engage in an individualised assessment of an applicant’s 
claims, and while it may, at least impliedly, recognise a diverse range of vulnerability’s sources, in-
cluding in its situational and pathogenic forms, the way in which the concept is applied by the Court 
in this particular context nevertheless relies on the attribution of vulnerability to an individual based 
173  To use the word employed by Judge Sajó in his partly concurring and partly dissenting opinion to the Grand Chamber’s 
judgment in M.S.S. See (n 2) 101.
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upon their membership of a recognised vulnerable sub-population group. The consequence for the 
ECtHR is an unduly rigid, essentialising conceptualisation of vulnerability that is ill-equipped to re-
spond effectively to the reality of increased mixed-migratory flows arriving at the borders of Europe 
by sea. The consequence for non-asylum-seeking migrants who have crossed the Mediterranean into 
Europe is that while the physical and psychological toll of their journey is to be noted by the Court, 
their resulting vulnerability remains unrecognised.
Yet, there is one final and somewhat curious aspect to the Grand Chamber’s unwillingness to rec-
ognise the vulnerability of non-asylum-seeking migrants crossing the Mediterranean. It is clear from 
surveying the Court’s judgments post-M.S.S. that just because asylum-seekers are now recognised as 
particularly vulnerable by the Court does not mean that a violation of the Convention will automat-
ically follow. This aligns with the position pre-M.S.S in respect to some other vulnerable groups, for 
instance, as in Chapman mentioned above.174 In Mahamed Jama, although the applicant was seeking 
asylum in Malta, and so therefore automatically met the two-pronged M.S.S. test of ‘particular vul-
nerability’,175 the Court found no violation of Article 3.176 This was because, in its view, even having 
taken into consideration the applicant’s particular vulnerability as an asylum-seeker, ‘the cumulative 
effect of the conditions complained of… did not amount to degrading treatment’.177 Moreover, and 
perhaps most intriguingly, the Court then went on to say that it ‘[did] not lose sight of the fact that 
the applicant… was not more vulnerable than any other adult asylum-seeker detained at the time’.178 
While the Court offered no further clarification at this point, more is revealed by looking to the sub-
sequent case of Abdullahi Elmi and Aweys Abubakar v Malta.179 As in Mahamed Jama, Abdullahi Elmi 
concerned irregular entry into Malta by boat.180 
Although there are numerous similarities between the two cases, there is one crucial difference. 
While the applicant in Mahamed Jama was an adult,181 the applicants in Abdullah Elmi were minors, 
aged sixteen and seventeen.182 In Abdullahi Elmi, the Court reiterated the particular vulnerability of 
the applicants as asylum-seekers,183 exactly as it had done in Mahamed Jama, but then went on to 
emphasise that the applicants were indeed minors. In the view of the Court, the applicants ‘were even 
more vulnerable than any other adult asylum-seeker detained at the time because of their age’.184 It 
174  Chapman (n 104).
175  Mahamed Jama (n 136) para 100.
176  ibid para 102.
177  ibid para 100.
178  ibid.
179  Abdullahi Elmi and Aweys Abubakar v Malta Apps nos 25794/13 and 28151/13 (ECtHR, 22 November 2016).
180  ibid paras 6 and 11.
181  The applicant in Mahamed Jama had in fact falsely claimed to be a minor during her stay in Malta. See (n 136) paras 11, 
13 and 99.
182  ibid para 113.
183  Abdullahi Elmi (n 179) para 113.
184  ibid.
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was at this point that Mahamed Jama was cited, a contrario.185 This is most interesting given that it 
was actually in its judgment in Mahamed Jama that the Court stated that the particular vulnerability 
of asylum-seekers ‘exists irrespective of… age factors’.186 While it may indeed be the case that age does 
not impact the Court’s recognition of asylum-seekers’ particular vulnerability, it nonetheless appears 
that age was here pivotal to whether a violation was found.187 The same also seems to have been the 
case in Tarakhel v Switzerland.188 Although in this case the six minors, aged between 2 and 15,189 
were accompanied by their parents (the applicants), the Grand Chamber nevertheless affirmed their 
‘extreme vulnerability’ as asylum-seeking children,190 before then reaching the conclusion that there 
would be a related violation of Article 3 should the family be returned to Italy without the necessary 
guarantees in place.191
It appears therefore that something more is needed to find a violation. Being one asylum-seeker 
amongst many is simply not enough. An applicant needs that certain something that, when combined 
with their ‘inherent’ and ‘particular’ vulnerability,192 means they stand out from the ‘asylum-seeking 
crowd’. Based on the post-M.S.S. case law, this certain something may very well be age, especial-
ly being a minor, although particularly poor living conditions may also suffice. Indeed, looking to 
M.S.S. itself, it was crucial that the applicant, who was not a minor, was residing in a state of the ‘most 
extreme poverty’.193 This is of course an exceedingly high bar to meet. It was to some degree neverthe-
less affirmed in Tarakhel, where although the ECtHR had ‘serious doubts’ about the capacity of the 
asylum reception system in Italy, it did not find the arrangements in Italy sufficiently deficient to ‘act 
as a bar to all removals of asylum seekers to that country’.194 What was though absolutely pivotal in 
Tarakhel was that the applicants had six children. It would therefore be reasonable to speculate that 
even if the applicants in Khlaifia had been asylum-seekers, they would likely still not have been suc-
cessful in their claim under Article 3, on account of their age, the short duration of their detention, 
and the Grand Chamber’s view that their detention conditions could be distinguished from the more 
severe conditions found in earlier cases. 
With the work of Beduschi and Timmer in mind, it seems therefore that for the ECtHR to find a vi-
olation in such cases requires some form of compounded vulnerability. Moreover, it appears that the 
compound must include the presence of at least one recognised vulnerable sub-population group, 
meaning that the Court is once again relying on a heavily traditional conceptualisation of vulnera-
bility as categorical. While being an asylum-seeker would suffice for this purpose, when it comes to 
185  Mahamed Jama (n 136) para 113.
186  ibid para 100.
187  ibid paras 113-115.
188  Tarakhel v Switzerland [GC] App no 29217/12 (ECtHR, 4 November 2015).
189  ibid para 1.
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non-asylum-seeking migrants, specifically irregular migrants, it seems that only in situations of the 
most ‘extreme’ vulnerability involving children would the vulnerability of the applicant act as ‘the de-
cisive factor… tak[ing] precedence over considerations relating to… status as an illegal immigrant’.195 
This finding that the recognition of particular vulnerability does not lead to an automatic violation 
of the Convention raises the broader question of why the Court has been so reluctant to accept the 
seemingly self-evident vulnerability of non-asylum-seeking migrants arriving at Europe’s southern 
shores. To provide a satisfactory answer to this question would likely require further empirical ex-
ploration, but what is clear is that for the Court to approach the question of vulnerability through 
the lens of the now asylum-seeker-specific M.S.S. test would be to present non-asylum-seeking mi-
grants with a fait accompli. The Court would not, as Peroni had hoped, be opening up the concept of 
vulnerability to embrace ‘other circumstances and other groups’,196 but would instead be utilising the 
vulnerability concept as a tool for exclusion.
4. Conclusion – Behind the times or a sign of the times?
The ECtHR’s judgments in the cases of M.S.S. and Khlaifia have proven to be of immense signifi-
cance not only for the rights protections of asylum-seeking and non-asylum-seeking migrants risk-
ing their lives to cross the Mediterranean, but also for the development, or lack thereof, of the Court’s 
understanding and use of the concept of vulnerability. While through these judgments the Court has 
engaged with differing conceptualisations of vulnerability, and for a brief period appeared to be mov-
ing towards a more nuanced and dynamic form of situational vulnerability, the ECtHR has ultimately 
stuck steadfastly to the much-maligned traditional approach of attributing individual vulnerability 
on the basis of vulnerable sub-population group membership. For those migrants who have made 
the perilous journey across the Mediterranean, but ‘who fall within the groups of undocumented 
migrants or rejected asylum-seekers rather than within the vulnerable group of asylum-seekers’, the 
Court has now made clear its position that they are not to be considered vulnerable as a group.197 It 
appears that only in the most extreme examples of compounded vulnerability will irregular migrants 
be recognised as vulnerable under the ECHR, and the likelihood is that those recognised as such will 
be minors. As has here been shown, such a position is lamentable. Rather than utilising the concept 
of vulnerability as a means by which to move towards a human rights law that is ‘more inclusive… 
[and] more responsive to the needs of vulnerable people’,198 whatever their legal or political status, 
the concept has instead been used to further exclude those who are already some of the most mar-
ginalised by society and the law.
195  Mubilanzila Mayeka (n 87) para 55; Rahimi v Greece App no 8687/08 (ECtHR, 5 April 2011) para 86.
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197  In response here to Flegar who posed this very question in 2016. See (n 83) 157.
198  Timmer (n 1) 122.
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Looking to other fields, it seems that change is being embraced. Within the medical sciences, the 
latest edition of the CIOMS Guidelines, published in 2016,199 exhibit a demonstrable semantic shift 
away from the traditional language of group-based vulnerability towards explicit recognition of in-
dividual vulnerability.200 Although the Guidelines do not reflect a complete conceptual split from 
the traditional approach,201 they do nonetheless emphasise ‘the importance of avoiding classifica-
tion of entire groups as inherently vulnerable’.202 The UNHCR Vulnerability Screening Tool203 also 
takes a strikingly similar approach. While the Tool does mention many of those groups commonly 
considered to be vulnerable, it also recognises the vulnerability of those who do not fit within the 
established categories, stating that ‘their individual circumstances and context are the main deter-
minates of vulnerability’.204 This is indeed in stark contrast to the ‘mere affiliation’ approach that 
characterises categorical conceptualisations of vulnerability.205 Moreover, the Tool warns against ‘a 
rigid or exhaustive measurement of vulnerability’,206 advocating instead for ‘a person-centred and 
holistic approach’.207 Such change is, however, yet to be seen in the ECtHR, and the Grand Chamber’s 
judgment in Khlaifia does very little to take any such steps towards this necessary conceptual shift.
It would, of course, be unhelpful to downplay the challenges that southern European states face as 
a result of ongoing influxes of migrants at their borders. The Grand Chamber indeed recognised as 
much in its Khlaifia judgment when it stated that ‘the undeniable difficulties and inconveniences en-
dured by the applicants stemmed to a significant extent from the situation of extreme difficulty con-
fronting the Italian authorities at the relevant time’.208 But for the Convention to be able to respond 
effectively to new challenges, it must adapt and evolve in line with the changing global socio-political 
climate. Moreover, the Court must remain vigilant and must continue to re-assert, perhaps now more 
than ever, that the responsibility for protecting the most vulnerable, whomever they may be, rests 
with the contracting states.
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200  ibid 57-58.
201  ibid. Reference is still made in the Guidelines to ‘members of groups that have traditionally been considered vulnerable’.
202  ibid 59.
203  UNHCR (n 131).
204  ibid 2.
205  Brandl and Czech (n 131) 250.
206  UNHCR (n 131) 3.
207  ibid.
208  Khlaifia [GC] (n 6) para 185. This position was then soon after relied upon in the Court’s judgment in the case of Ilias 
and Ahmed v Hungary App no 47287/15 (ECtHR, 14 March 2017) para 83. Ilias also concerned the entry of asylum-seekers 
into Europe, albeit via the Western Balkan route. 
